I'm delighted to read that the Supreme Court has upheld Congress' ban on "partial birth" abortion. It is a gruesome procedure that has no business being performed in any so-called "peaceful" nation. For instance, take this nice little descriptor, from the Court's decision:
§ 2. (c)(i) The Acts text discloses that it prohibits a doctor from intentionally performing an intact D&E. Its dual prohibitions correspond with the steps generally undertaken in this procedure: The doctor (1) delivers the fetus until its head lodges in the cervix, usually past the anatomical landmark for a breech presentation, see §1531(b)(1)(A), and (2) proceeds to the overt act of piercing or crushing the fetal skull after the partial delivery, see §1531(b)(1)(B). The Acts scienter requirements limit its reach to those physicians who carry out the intact D&E, with the intent to undertake both steps at the outset. The Act excludes most D&Es in which the doctor intends to remove the fetus in pieces from the outset. This interpretation is confirmed by comparing the Act with the Nebraska statute in Stenberg. There, the Court concluded that the statute encompassed D&E, which often involve[s] a physician pulling a substantial portion of a still living fetus . . . , say, an arm or leg, into the vagina prior to the death of the fetus, 530 U. S., at 939, and rejected the Nebraska Attorney General's limiting interpretation that the statutes reference to a procedure that kill[s] the unborn child was to a distinct procedure, not to the abortion procedure as a whole, id., at 943. It is apparent Congress responded to these concerns because the Act adopts the phrase delivers a living fetus, 18 U. S. C. §1531(b)(1)(A), instead of delivering . . . a living unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof, 530 U. S., at 938, thereby targeting extraction of an entire fetus rather than removal of fetal pieces; identifies specific anatomical landmarks to which the fetus must be partially delivered, §1531(b)(1)(A), thereby clarifying that the removal of a small portion of the fetus is not prohibited; requires the fetus to be delivered so that it is partially outside the [mothers] body, §1531(b)(1)(A), thereby establishing that delivering a substantial portion of the fetus into the vagina would not subject a doctor to criminal sanctions; and adds the overt-act requirement, §1531(b)(1), thereby making the distinction the Nebraska statute failed to draw (but the Nebraska Attorney General advanced). Finally, the canon of constitutional avoidance, see, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575, extinguishes any lingering doubt. Interpreting the Act not to prohibit standard D&E is the most reasonable reading and understanding of its terms.
§ 3. (b) This traditional rule is consistent with Casey, which confirms both that the State has an interest in promoting respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy, and that abortion doctors should be treated the same as other doctors. Medical uncertainty does not foreclose the exercise of legislative power in the abortion context any more than it does in other contexts. Other considerations also support the Courts conclusion, including the fact that safe alternatives to the prohibited procedure, such as D&E, are available. In addition, if intact D&E is truly necessary in some circumstances, a prior injection to kill the fetus allows a doctor to perform the procedure, given that the Acts prohibition only applies to the delivery of a living fetus, 18 U. S. C. §1531(b)(1)(A). Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 7779, distinguished. [ed.: All emphasis mine.]